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I. INTRODUCTION
The relationship of our society with contemporary art is not unlike our relationship with
mirrors.1 What we see in contemporary artworks and what we see when we look in the mirror
may be beautiful, ugly, surprising, or even incomprehensible. Some reflections, like artworks,
are generally liked or disliked, and some are a matter of personal taste. While we give shape
and form to the images we see in the mirror, these images, in turn, shape us—although perhaps
on a deeper level.2
The essence of contemporary art as an art form is complex and multifaceted.3 Some
contemporary artworks are more aesthetic-oriented, evoking the traditional era of paintings made
with paint and sculptures hewn from marble. Others’ works push the artistic envelope into the
realm of commentary, either on social issues or on art itself, using unorthodox mediums in
surprising ways.4 In this era of artistic pluralism,5 art critics and philosophers alike hesitate to
answer the question “What is art?”;6 some even claim there cannot be an answer.7

See Arthur Danto, The Artworld, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 61, No. 19, 571 (Oct. 15, 1964): “Hamlet and
Socrates, though in praise and deprecation respectively, spoke of art as a mirror held up to nature.”; see also OSCAR
WILDE, THE DECAY OF LYING, reprinted in OSCAR WILDE: COLLECTED WORKS 1134, 1146 (Barnes & Noble
Publishing, ed., 2006): “Life imitates art far more than Art imitates life.”
2
See MARY ANNE STANISZEWSKI, BELIEVING IS SEEING: CREATING THE CULTURE OF ART 289 (Penguin Books Ltd,
1995): “The most important artists of our time are visionary in that they continue to challenge us to see our world
differently. They represent our culture in enlightened and, at time, beautiful ways. Artists prepare the mind and the
spirit for new ideas—new ways of seeing.”
3
“Contemporary” art is the broad temporal genre encompassing art created in the late 20th and early 21st centuries,
and the art to come in the future. Scholars have used the label “contemporary” to describe the art of “the present
moment” throughout the past century, because an era and its art can only be defined retroactively. See Dan
Karlhom, Surveying Contemporary Art: Post-War, Postmodern, And Then What?, Art History, Vol. 32, No. 7 (Sept.
2009), 712-33, 716.
4
Peter Plagens, How Art Has Changed A Lot, American Art, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 2008), 8-10, 8.
1

1

The result of art’s struggle with definition, however, is at times a terribly difficult and
strained reconciliation with the clarity desired by United States laws and methods of legal
application, especially in the area of copyright law. Granting an artwork intellectual property
protection is crucial for the artist to maintain both economic and cultural standing as a creator of
artworks in America’s modern society; nevertheless, current interpretations of copyright law as
applied to contemporary works of art may be dictating, and even restricting, the artistic
“Progress” encouraged by our nation’s Constitution. 8
Part II of this Article introduces a recent victim of such interpretations: works of art
created from organic or natural media. While this growing field of art encompasses many subgenres,9 natural media artworks all share the common use of the Earth in their creation. I will
sketch a brief history of this field and its relevant ancestry, in order to explore and understand the
aims of natural-media art and of contemporary art in general.
The legal issues addressed in this Article arose in the Seventh Circuit case of Kelley v.
Chicago Park District,10 discussed in Part III. After the park district destroyed Wildflower
Works, a living version of artist Chapman Kelley’s floral paintings, Mr. Kelley was denied moral
rights—delineated by the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990—11 to his work because the court
determined it did not pass the basic standard of copyrightability due to its organic flora

5

Surveying Contemporary Art: Post-War, Postmodern, And Then What?, 713, supra note 3, art historian Eleanor
Heartney describes this generation of art as an “era of apparently anarchic pluralism,” 2008.
6
How Art Has Changed A Lot, supra note 4.
7
See Arthur Danto, From Philosophy to Art Criticism, American Art, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 2002) 14-17, 16-17,
explaining that as far as modes of artistic production are concerned, nothing is justifiably preferable to anything else
(not ruling out distinctions in quality with no objective direction for art to take.)
8
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9
Sub-categories of natural-media art include, but are not limited to: Earth Art, Land Art, Environmental Art, Ecoart,
and Bio-art. See AMY LIPTON AND TRICIA WATTS, ECOLOGICAL AESTHETICS, ART IN ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN:
THEORY AND PRACTICE, Chapter: From Signs to Sculptural Places (Birkhäuser Publishers, 2004).
10
Kelly v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
11
17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (2012).
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medium.12 The court held that a work using natural materials as a medium cannot be authored or
fixed for purposes of copyright.13 This decision, recently denied for review by the Supreme
Court,14 is distressing because of the possibly damaging legal effects on works which incorporate
natural or organic media, and on the artists who rely on the copyright system for economic and
social protection for their works.
In Part IV, I analyze the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in light of the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution, the 1976 Copyright Act, and governing case law. After considering
the Seventh Circuit’s rationale for its decision, I argue that this court incorrectly decided Kelley
v. Chicago Park District as a result of its faulty statutory interpretation and its ignorance of
black-letter law and precedential case law.15 Furthermore, I present the consequential issues this
court created in denying basic copyrightability to Mr. Kelley’s work.
I conclude in Part V with an analysis of the broader implication of this decision as an
example of problematic judicial activism which arises in cases concerning complex works of
contemporary art. I argue it is important for the courts to put aside subjective notions of taste,
aesthetic preference, and artistic judgment if these courts are to apply a proper and objective
analysis of a work’s copyrightability, following both statute and precedential case law. I argue
that straying from this path of taste neutrality impedes artistic development and the cultural and
social progress encouraged by the Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause, and by application
leaves many artists without legal paths for relief when their livelihoods are compromised.

12

Works must pass a relatively low legal standard to gain copyrightability, consisting of physical fixation and a
modicum of creativity. Most works pass these two tests with ease.
13
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292.
14
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., No. 11-101 (U.S. filed Oct. 3, 2011),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-101.htm.
15
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011).
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II. THE NATURE OF NATURE IN ART:
UNDERSTANDING ITS PURPOSE AND GOALS
In the 1960s, the trajectory of the traditional institutionalized art common to our Western
civilization drastically changed direction. Fueled partly by the notorious “readymades” of
Marcel Duchamp,16 and partly by the nationwide social upheaval of that era,17 American artists
funneled their sense of rebellion and skepticism of the traditional towards transcending the status
quo of art.18 The result was a post-modern explosion of artistic movements founded in the
conceptual, including: pop art, minimalism, op art, conceptual art, earth art, land art,
environmental art, body art and photo-realism, to name only a few. These movements persisted
into the 1970s and 1980s, when artists continued to expand upon these concepts, often recycling
and remolding them to better fit the social climate of the decade.19 By the latter half of the
1990s, artists no longer felt the need to rebel against art history, and many returned to the
aesthetic-based techniques of Modernism,20 or at least began to include these methods in their
conceptual works.21
In the past decade, after centuries of evolution through art reflecting upon itself, the
artistic community has joined the rest of the world in its shift towards globalization.22 The art of

16

Referring to: Bicycle Wheel, 1913: Common bicycle wheel mounted upside down on an ordinary stool; Fountain,
1917: Urinal turned on its side atop pedestal. See Nat Rosenthal, Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968), Heibrunn Timeline
of Art History, Metropolitan Museum of Art, www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/duch/hd_duch.htm, Sept. 17, 2011.
These “readymades” “challenged the boundaries and even the foundations of art as a concept.” Steven Goldsmith,
The Readymades of Marcel Duchamp: The Ambiguities of an Aesthetic Revolution, The Journal of Aesthetics and
Art Criticism, 197-208, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Winter 1983), at 197.
17
Marcel Duchamp (1887-1968), supra note 16.
18
Id.
19
Surveying Contemporary Art: Post-War, Postmodern, And Then What?, 720-21, supra note 1.
20
The artistic movement of Modernism is summarized by an attitude of “Art for Art’s Sake,” asserting the artist’s
privilege to combine whatever elements he pleases for aesthetic effect alone. Artists effectively reversed all the
methods devised since the Renaissance for transmuting a flat surface into a pictorial space, and instead believed
“that brush strokes and color patches themselves, not what they stand for, are the artist’s primary reality.” See H.W.
JANSON WITH DORA JANE JANSON, HISTORY OF ART: A SURVEY OF THE MAJOR VISUAL ARTS FROM THE DAWN OF
HISTORY TO THE PRESENT DAY 492-93 (Harry N. Abrams, Inc. ed., 18th ed., 1974).
21
Id. at 726.
22
Id. at 729.
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this new generation focuses on eroding traditional conceptual and geographical boundaries, by
working in a broad range of media, including new technologies, with more audience involvement
and the presentation of bigger spectacles.23 These contemporary artists “are connected to
something greater than themselves and art: the world, the human spirit, democracy or the
universe.”24
In particular, our society’s fixation on the current state of the relationship between
humans and the environment inspires many artists to attempt to draw the fast-paced, industrydriven, technology-obsessed American back to nature by utilizing organic materials in their
works. Today, our fascination with sustainability and “green living” is reflected not just in the
food we eat or the cars we drive, but also in our art. This art ranges from the purely aesthetic to
message-laden metaphors, using the Earth’s bounty as a medium for their expressions.25
III. KELLY V. CHICAGO PARK DISTRICT
A. An Artist’s Fight
Chapman Kelley is a nationally recognized artist, traditionally known for his
representational paintings of landscapes and flora—in particular, romantic flora and woodland
paintings set within ellipses.26 In the past sixty years, the Texas native has received many

23

See BELIEVING IS SEEING at 255-301(supra note 2) for examples of this new generation of artworks.
Id.
25
Examples of these works include: Vaughn Bell’s Personal Forest Floor (Portable Mountain) (2003-08), small
organic landscapes on wheels meant to be tended to and walked around like pets, and Village Green (2008),
suspended personal and portable biospheres. Rachel Wolff, “Turning Over a New Leaf,” ARTnews (April 2009)
http://www.artnews.com/2009/04/01/turning-over-a-new-leaf/. See also T. Allen Comp’s The Litmus Garden
(2001), a collection of native trees and shrubs planted alongside a six-pond color-changing water treatment system.
“Litmus Garden,” greenmuseum.org, greenmuseum.org/content/artist_content/ct_id-14_artist_id-15.html, (last
visited Oct. 27, 2011).
26
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 291. See Image 1.
24
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prestigious awards for his paintings and has participated in multiple major exhibitions throughout
the country.27
In 1984, Mr. Kelley decided to take his artwork beyond the canvas and actualize his
wildflower ellipses.28 He received permission from the Chicago Park District to install two oval
flower beds the size of football fields in Grant Park along the city’s lakefront.29 Mr. Kelley
installed—and personally financed—between 48 and 60 species of wildflowers native to the
Chicago region with help from his own team of volunteers.30 The flowers were selected solely
by Mr. Kelley, and planted so that they would blossom sequentially, with colors changing
throughout the season and increasing in brightness towards the center of each ellipse.31 The
work was entitled Chicago Wildflower Work I (hereinafter Wildflower Works).
In addition to the aesthetic design, this real-life “painting” was also a test of “ ‘the
economic and ecological impact of introducing wildflowers into cities,’ ” including possibilities
of erosion control, reductions in water consumption and mowing, and gas, manpower, and
pollution reduction.32 The work, promoted as “living art,” was a great success with the public
and with state politicians.33
Wildflower Works was maintained by Mr. Kelley and his volunteers until 2004, when
park officials wished to reconfigure Wildflower Works to accommodate new construction in the

27

Chapman Kelley Biography 2011, Chapman Kelley.com,
http://chapmankelley.com/3/Asset.asp?AssetID=6098&AKey=JLBDK6W2 (last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
28
Wildflowers As Art in a Chicago Park, New York Times, June 20, 1985,
www.nytimes.com/1985/06/20/garden/wildflowers-as-art-in-a-chicago-park.html.
29
Id.
30
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 293.
31
Id. See Images 2 and 3.
32
Wildflowers As Art in a Chicago Park, supra note 26.
33
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 292. See also Wildflowers As Art in a Chicago Park, supra note 28 (where the chief
horticulturalist for the Chicago Park District was quoted as stating that “Wildflower Works” is “unique in scope and
size, and for its contrast and color.”
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park.34 When notified of the reconfiguration, Mr. Kelley refused to approve the changes; the
park officials nevertheless moved forward with the reconfiguration a week later. Wildflower
Works was reduced in size by half and the remaining wildflowers were moved into smaller
rectangular beds along with new plantings.35
Shortly afterward, Mr. Kelley sued the Chicago Park District on the basis that the
reconfiguration of Wildflower Works violated his moral rights under the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990 (“VARA”).36 Mr. Kelley claimed that the reconfiguration was an intentional
“distortion, mutilation, or other modification” of his work, and was “prejudicial to his...honor
[and] reputation.37
In 2008, the U.S. district court for the Northern District of Illinois held for the Park
District, finding that, even though Kelley’s work could fit the definition of a painting or
sculpture required for moral rights protection under VARA, Wildflower Works lacked the basic
copyright requisites of original authorship and fixation. Thus, VARA protection could not be
applied because the work was inherently uncopyrightable.38 Kelley subsequently appealed this
decision to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s
holding in January 2011.39

34

Kelley, 635 F.3d at 294.
Id. See Image 4.
36
Kelley, 635 F.3d.at 295. VARA, 17 U.S.C.A. § 106A, stems from the French Droit moral, which “arise[s] from
the belief that an artist, in the process of creation, injects some of his spirit into the art and that, consequently, the
artist’s personality, as well as the integrity of the work, should be protected and preserved.” RALPH E. LERNER AND
JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW 1252, vol. 2 (Practising Law Institute, 3d ed. 2005). VARA grants artists the right “... to
prevent any destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work which would be prejudicial to his
or her honor or reputation, and which is the result of an intentional or negligent act or omission with respect to that
work....” § 106A(a)(3). However, this protection is limited to the following works of visual art: “a painting,
drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer... or a still
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only.” 17 U.S.C.A § 101. Furthermore, a work of visual art
does not include “any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.” Id.
37
Id.
38
Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75791 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
39
Kelly, 635 F.3d at 290.
35

7

B. The Copyright Standard
While the Seventh Circuit Court rejected the district court’s holding that “Wildflower
Works” could be considered a work of visual art under VARA,40 the circuit court did agree that
the work did not meet the basic copyrightability standards of original authorship and fixation
required for VARA qualification.41
Copyright protection is rooted in Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution,
which delegates to Congress the “Power ... to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”42 This Intellectual Property Clause provides an economic incentive
for artists to create art by awarding them the right to profit from their creation for a specific
amount of time, in return for their eventual contribution to the public and towards the “Progress”
fostered by the Constitution.43
The most recent codification of the Intellectual Property Clause is the Copyright Act of
1976,44 which limits copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium45 of expression”46 Furthermore, when the work at issue is a compilation of preexisting
Holding that for a work to receive VARA protection, “it cannot just be ‘pictorial’ or ‘sculptural’ in some aspect or
effect, it must actually be a ‘painting’ or a ‘sculpture.’ Not metaphorically or by analogy, but really.” Id. at 300.
41
Id. at 299.
42
U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43
LEONARD D. DUBOFF & CHRISTY O. KING, ART LAW (IN A NUTSHELL) 158 (West Group, 3d ed. 2000).
44
17 U.S.C.A. prec § 101.
45
The medium in which a work is executed does not affect its copyrightablility, so long as the work complies with
the other requirements. See note 43 supra at 167.
46
17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a). “Subject matter of copyright: In general: (a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance
with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the
aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4)
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.” (Emphasis added). Additionally, 17
U.S.C.A § 102(b) clarifies that copyright protection does not extend to “any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery ....” See also H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), explaining
the narrow language change from that used the Intellectual Property Clause to what is used in the Copyright Act: “In
using the phrase “original works of authorship,” rather than “all the writings of an author” ..., the committee’s
40
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elements with a different end result (as seen in Wildflower Works), the copyright in the work
“extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work ....”47
C. The Seventh Circuit’s Analysis and Holding
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit saw Mr. Kelley’s work of art as nothing
more than a living garden, which, it claimed, inherently lacked the kind of authorship and stable
fixation explicitly required by the Intellectual Property Clause to support copyright.48 The court
stated that copyrightable works must be the original product of a human author; the forces of
nature cannot be copyrighted, and it follows that “gardens are planted and cultivated, not
authored.”49 While the court found Wildflower Works to possess the requisite level of originality
for copyright,50 the court rejected the argument that Mr. Kelley’s design of Wildflower Works
was an act of authorship, asserting that “[t]o the extent that seeds or seedlings can be considered
a ‘medium of expression,’ they originate in nature, and natural forces—not the intellect of the
gardener—determine their form, growth, and appearance.”51
Furthermore, the court did not find the work to be “fixed,” holding that “a garden is
simply too changeable to satisfy the primary purpose of fixation52 .... It may endure from season
to season, but its nature is one of dynamic change.”53 The court was also troubled by its inability

purpose is to avoid exhausting the constitutional power of Congress to legislate in this field, and to eliminate the
uncertainties arising from the latter phrase.”
47
17 U.S.C.A § 103(b). “The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed
by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply
any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the preexisting material.”
48
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 303.
49
Id. at 304. See also Id. quoting U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM II: COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES
§ 503.03(a), (1984): “‘[A] work must be the product of human authorship’ and not the forces of nature.”
50
Kelley 635 F.3d at 303.
51
Id. at 304.
52
“Fixation serves two basic roles: (1) easing problems of proof or creation and infringement, and (2) providing the
dividing line between state common law protection and protection under the federal Copyright Act, since works that
are not fixed are ineligible for federal protection but may be protected under state law.” Id., quoting 2 Patry on
Copyright § 3:22.
53
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 304-05.
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to determine what the baseline for fixation and copyright infringement may be for a variable
work such as Wildflower Works, for without a sufficiently permanent and stable copy of the
designer’s intellectual expression, the work is not as easily susceptible to infringing copying and
as such does not require copyright protection.54
The court did attempt to clarify its holding, maintaining that it was “not suggesting that
copyright attaches only to works that are static or fully permanent (no medium of expression
lasts forever), or that artists who incorporate natural or living elements in their work can never
claim copyright.”55 Following this analysis, the court would find copyrightability in other
variable works, such as Alexander Calder’s wind-activated mobiles, and even works created
using natural materials, such as Jeff Koons’ oversized floral topiary Puppy.56
Because the court found Wildflower Works to be neither authored nor fixed in the senses
required for basic copyright under the Act, the court determined that Wildflower Works would
not qualify for moral-rights protection under VARA.57 The Seventh Circuit court remanded to
the district court with instructions to enter judgment for the Chicago Park District.58
Following this holding, on July 18, 2011, Mr. Kelley filed a petition for writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court, asking the Court to determine “[w]hether an original work
of art that incorporates living elements is ‘unauthored’ and thus not protected under the
Copyright Act,” and “[w]hether an original work of art that incorporates living elements can be
‘fixed’ for the purposes of protection under the Copyright Act.”59 While American artists and

54

Id. at 305.
Id.
56
Id. at 305-06.
57
Id. at 306.
58
Id. at 308.
59
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011), appeal docketed, No.
11-101 (U.S. July 25, 2011).
55
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their advocates urged, in amici briefs,60 the “high court [to] open[] the door to protecting artists’
rights,” they were unsuccessful.61 The petition was denied by the Supreme Court on October 3,
2011.62
D. Kelley’s Effect on Contemporary American Art and Artists
With the denial of Mr. Kelley’s petition for writ of certiorari, the Seventh Circuit’s ruling
on copyrightability for works which incorporate natural materials stands as the reigning decision
on the issue. The effects of this holding on American visual artists and their works are
substantial and significantly burdensome; following Kelley, works of art employing natural
media run a grave risk of being uncopyrightable.63 As a result, many artists will now find
themselves unable to protect both their economic rights—through the Act—and their moral
rights—through VARA—over their works, leaving their art and their well-being as artists legally
without merit.
Art enthusiasts argue that the court’s muddled analysis of the authorship and fixation
elements “has opened up a Pandora’s box of copyright issues for a vast spectrum of artwork
incorporating natural elements;” and that the court’s degradation of Mr. Kelley’s artistic and
intellectual efforts to the labor of a gardener “greatly undermine[s] the domains of land art, bioart and any other artwork involving the medium of nature.”64

60

See Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kelley v. Chi. Park
Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11-101), 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6228, and Brief for The Intellectual Property Law
Assoc. of Chicago as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 132 S. Ct. 380 (2011) (No. 11101), 2011 U.S. LEXIS 6228.
61
Peter Simek, Dallas Artist Chapman Kelley Takes Wildflower Case to Supreme Court, Dallas Magazine (July 26,
2011, 8:50 AM), http://frontrow.dmagazine.com/2011/07/dallas-artist-chapman-kelley-takes-wildflower-case-tosupreme-court/.
62
See note 14 supra.
63
Chin-Chin Yap, The Un-Edenic State of Copyright, ArtAsiaPacific (May/June 2011),
artasiapacific.com/Magazine/73/TheUnEdenicStateOfCopyright.
64
Id.
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While the court cited Wildflower Works’s vitality as one reason for its uncopyrightability,
the opinion also leaves in limbo those artworks using lifeless materials which originated in
nature, such as Damien Hirst’s famed tiger shark suspended in a tank of formaldehyde, and those
works which are part nature, part man-made, such as the 7,000 oak tree and stone column pairs
Joseph Beuys placed throughout New York City.65
The Seventh Circuit’s self-comforting rationale that “the law must have some limits”66 is
viewed as the “kiss of death to conceptual art” and detrimental to artists’ rights.67 Art advocates
warn that the Seventh Circuit’s ruling not only “‘create[s] an adverse precedent for US artists
who use organic material to make their art,’ impacting not just Kelley but also ‘the broader US
arts community and the rights of painters and sculptors,’”68 but also “challenge[s] and harm[s]
the ability to advise and educate artists in the area of copyright law, especially with regard to
works of art incorporating living materials and other innovative materials.”69 Such an
undesirable use of American copyright law carries on the practice of judicial hostility towards
the arts community in the United States.70
IV. QUESTIONING THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
The art community’s concern that the Seventh Circuit’s decision and the Supreme
Court’s refusal to review this decision will significantly hinder future artistic and intellectual
advancement if other courts follow in these footsteps demands a more detailed assessment of the

Id., discussing Damien Hirst’s The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991) and
Joseph Beuys’ 7,000 Oaks (1982-87).
66
Kelley, 635 F.3d at 306.
67
Sergio Muñoz Sarmiento, Esq., Court: Not All Conceptual Art May Be Copyrighted, Clancco: Art + Law
(February 16, 2011), http://clancco.com/wp/2011/02/vara_moral-rights_sculpture_originality/.
68
Martha Lufkin, Chicago court denies artist’s copyright appeal, The Art Newspaper (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Chicago+court+denies+artist’s+copyright+appeal/23575.
69
See Brief for Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Kelley, 132 S. Ct. 380
(No. 11-101).
70
Dallas Artist Chapman Kelley Takes Wildflower Case to Supreme Court, supra note 61.
65
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Seventh Circuit’s analysis.71 Below is an examination of what is required of a work to be
eligible for copyrightability, paralleled with the Seventh Circuit’s own interpretation of the §
102(a) requirements. Specifically, we must delve deeper into the two operative holdings of the
Seventh Circuit’s ruling: (1) that using materials found in nature in one’s artwork is the “wrong
kind” of authorship for copyright protection, as these materials owe their appearance to nature,
not the author; and (2) that using living materials in an artwork precludes fixation for purposes of
copyright despite the work’s otherwise tangible and perceivable form.72
A. Original Work of the “Wrong Kind” of Authorship:
Untangling the Seventh Circuit’s Oxymoron
i. Clarifying the Language
In order to sustain the utilitarian give and take of protection and progress embodied in the
Intellectual Property Clause, §102(a) of the Act requires that a work must be an “original work
of authorship” in order to be awarded copyright protection.73 The 1976 Act does not define the
terms within this requirement. Instead, Congress deferred to the case law under the previous
1909 Act for its desired interpretation of the standard.74 While the 1909 Act did not expressly
require originality, the courts uniformly inferred the requirement from the fact that only
“authors” could claim copyright protection for their works.75 The term “author” was defined as
“‘the beginner ... or first mover of anything ... creator, originator.’”76 Today, the “author” is
more specifically recognized as the intellect behind the matter—the person who conceptualizes

71

Advocacy, Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts, www.vlany.org/advocacy.index.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1.
73
See notes 42 and 46, supra.
74
See 1-2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.01 (2011), quoting H.R. REP NO. 94-1476, at 51: “The phrase ‘original works
or authorship,’ which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the standard of
originality established by the courts under the present [1909] copyright statute.”
75
1-2 Nimmer on Copyright § 2.01.
76
Id., quoting Remick Music Corp. v. Interstate Hotel Co. of Neb., 58 F.Supp 523, 531 (D. Neb. 1944).
72
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and directs the development of the work’s form and content, rather than the person who simply
follows orders to physically execute the work.77
These definitions suggest mutuality between the terms “authorship” and “originality”—a
work is not the product of an author unless the work is original.78 It follows that we must also
determine the intended meaning of “originality” for copyright purposes. While the term seems
to evoke a necessity for a new and unique work as a whole, in application it only calls for
independent creation by a person as an expression of one’s imaginative spark or minimal degree
of creativity—not novelty.79 Therefore, “a work will not be denied copyright protection simply
because it is substantially similar to a work previously produced by others, and hence, is not
novel.”80 The terms “original” and “author” signify codependent, almost inherently identical,
requirements for copyright: when a work is independently created—not copied from other
works—it is original, and an original work’s creator must be an author.81
The Supreme Court took pains to highlight this inherent interconnectedness in BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony.82 In determining original authorship of a photograph, the
Court looked for the imprint of the author in the subject’s pose, expression, costume, and
accessories, and in the photograph’s arrangement of light and shadow on both the subject and the
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80
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background.83 These visible elements owed their origin to the author of the photograph, thus
indicating originality for copyright purposes.84
This understanding of originality and authorship is not only dictated by the Supreme
Court,85 but is also accepted by almost every federal circuit—including the Seventh—86 and is
thus without question dispositive on both the Seventh Circuit and our investigation infra.
For compilation works, such as Wildflower Works, copyright protection requires an
additional step: an analysis of the work’s specific identifiable components to determine the scope
of the work’s protection. While a work as a whole may be original enough to receive copyright
protection, specific components within the work may not qualify as “original” and “authored,”
and therefore the artist cannot receive piecemeal copyright protection for those components.87
Interpretation of this requirement for copyright universally follows the Supreme Court’s holding

Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright’s Response to the Invention of Photography, 65 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 385, 390 (2004).
84
Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58, indicating that writings as indicated in the Intellectual Property Clause include all
forms of visible expression of the author’s ideas.
85
See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (original pieces of art are tangible expressions of an artist’s ideas);
Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (requiring only a minimal degree of
creativity in original works).
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in the seminal case of Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co,88 where the Supreme
Court held that, while facts are not copyrightable because they do not owe their origin to an act
of authorship,89 compilations of facts may receive copyright protection, depending the originality
of the compilation.90
Once again, while the originality factor is the sine qua non of copyright, the requisite
level in a compilation is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.91 So long as the
choices of selection and arrangement “are made independently by the compiler and entail a
minimal degree of creativity, [the compilation is] sufficiently original that Congress may protect
such compilations through the copyright laws.”92 Again, such copyright protection is limited
only to the elements of the work that are original to the author.93
Like compilation works containing facts, those works which utilize elements found in
nature, such as Wildflower Works, must also undergo scrutiny to analytically separate the
authored elements from the uncopyrightable in order to determine the scope of copyright
protection. The United States Copyright Office dictates that a work “must owe its origin to a
human being. Materials produced solely by nature, by plants, or by animals are not
Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). In this case, the court held that
alphabetical listings of names, accompanied by towns and phone numbers, in a telephone book’s white pages were
not copyrightable because the listings were uncopyrightable facts, and the telephone company did not select,
coordinate, or arrange these uncopyrightable facts in an original way sufficient to satisfy the minimum standards for
copyright protection.
89
“The most fundamental axiom of copyright law is that ‘no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he
narrates.’” Id. at 344-45, quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
90
Id. at 344. The Court followed the definition of “compilation” as found in § 101 of the Copyright Act: “a work
formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” Id. at 356,
quoting 17 U.S.C.A § 101 (1976). See also § 103(b) of the Copyright Act, which states that “copyright in a
compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work.” 17 U.S.C.A. §
103(b) (1988).
91
Id. at 345.
92
Id. at 348. The Court later clarified “that the selection and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or
routine as to require no creativity whatsoever.” Id. at 362.
93
Id. at 348. See also the 17 U.S.C.S. § 103(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976, which states that “copyright in a
compilation or derivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material.”
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copyrightable. ”94 Examples of such noncopyrightable works include those produced by
mechanical process or random selection without any contribution by a human author, such as a
multi-colored pebble design on a linoleum floor, and those owing their forms exclusively to the
forces of nature, such as a polished and mounted piece of driftwood.95
ii. The Mistake
In determining that Wildflower Works was created by the “wrong kind” of author, the
Seventh Circuit strayed from the Supreme Court’s binding precedent in Feist and the accepted
interpretation of this requirement in the Copyright Act, and contradicted rulings on compilation
works by multiple circuits, including the Seventh itself.96 While the court was given the difficult
task of understanding and deconstructing a nonconventional conceptual work of art, this
difficulty does not justify its erroneous analysis of the law. The following reasons explain why
the Seventh Circuit’s application of the original authorship requirement is flawed, and how this
application threatens the scope of copyright as envisioned by the Constitution.
First, it is clear that Wildflower Works is both original and authored as defined by the
statutory interpretation and legislative history of § 102(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act.97 The
Seventh Circuit conceded in Kelley the inherent interconnectedness of the statute’s relevant
terms,98 yet failed to apply this theory in its analysis. The court first appropriately rebuked the
district court’s holding that the work was not original because it was not novel.99 It is plain to

94
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the Seventh Circuit that Wildflower Works was not copied and plainly possessed more than a
little creative spark, 100 although the court did not explain how it came to this conclusion.
We can instead turn to the facts of the case to show how Wildflower Works was
independently created by its author, using more than a minimal degree of creativity.101

As a

work which clearly utilizes uncopyrightable materials to create the work as a whole, we must
look to the rules for compilation works outlined in Feist and § 103 of the Act, and separate the
uncopyrightable elements created by nature from the rest of the work.102 While the individual
wildflowers themselves are not original to Mr. Kelley, the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the flowers are completely original to him.103 Mr. Kelley was the sole mind
behind the concept and development of the artwork.104 Furthermore, witnesses of the artwork
state that it was “unique in scope and size, and for its contrast and color.”105 This is more than
enough to substantiate a finding of originality in Wildflower Works for the purposes of copyright.
After discussing originality, however, the Seventh Circuit took a drastically wrong turn in
holding that, despite its originality, Wildflower Works lacks the requisite “authorship” needed to
establish basic copyrightability.106 As a work which utilizes uncopyrightable materials,
protection will depend on the authorship of the selection, coordination, and arrangement of the
materials.107 If the artist’s variations of these elements are original, they may earn copyright
protection.108 Following Supreme Court precedent,109 these elements were original to Mr.
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Kelley, and as such were per se “authored” by Mr. Kelley, and thus Wildflower Works is an
“original work of authorship.”
Yet in its analysis of the work’s “authorship,” the Seventh Circuit ignored both precedent
to determine original authorship, and the reasons why it found originality in Wildflower Works in
the first place. The court did recognize that Mr. Kelley specifically chose each wildflower
according to his concept and deliberately arranged and planted them in a unique sculptural
format.110 However, in its analysis of “authorship,” the court mistakenly focused on the natural
materials used in the work and the overall creation’s basic resemblance to a flower garden:
“[s]imply put, gardens are planted and cultivated, not authored.”111 According to the court,
Wildflower Works is just a garden, nothing more.112 The court’s decision turns on the authorship
of the work’s primary medium. The floral components of this compilation inarguably owe their
individual form and appearance to natural forces;113 however, the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of the flowers were not results of nature, and may be considered the product of an
author if they are original.114 The court disregarded this second step dictated by the Supreme
Court in Feist, and, in confusing the concepts of artistic materials with artistic works, stopped
short of considering the elements beyond the individual flowers which make Wildflower Works
an original work.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding on authorship as dictated by the author of the medium is
also clearly inconsistent with already-copyrighted works which use materials found in nature.115
For example, the Copyright Office has granted numerous copyright registrations to the floral and
110
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fruit sculptures created by the well-known food retailer Edible Arrangements, and also to the
American Sand Art Corporation for its sand sculptures.116 Even though the mediums of fruit and
sand are authored solely by nature, the authorship requirement for copyright is not concerned
with the medium of the work, and so these original sculptures authored by humans can be
granted copyright protection.
B. Stretching the Language of Fixation
i. Clarifying the Language
The second requirement for basic copyright, fixation of the work, is Congress’s method
of ensuring that in exchange for copyright protection, the work can be later made available for
others to copy in the public domain.117 A “fixed” work is crucial to the “deal” between society
and the author of a work; without fixation, the author deposits nothing into the public domain.118
It also guarantees that only the expression of the idea is protected, rather than the idea itself, and
thus preserves the idea/expression dichotomy of the copyright system.119 This necessary
separation of ideas from expressions owes its origin to the “Writings” created by “Authors” as
stated in the Intellectual Property Clause.120 As codified, § 102(a) of the Copyright Act dictates
that a work be fixed in a “tangible medium of expression,” and the fixation is sufficient if the
work “can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device.”121

Id., referring to Edible Arrangements’ “Berry Bouquet,” Reg. No. VA0001021475; “Blooming daises,” Reg. No.
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The accompanying House Report explains the reason for the sufficiency standard is “to
avoid the artificial and largely unjustifiable distinctions ... under which statutory copyrightability
in certain cases has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is
fixed.”122 These “certain cases” referred to by Congress are those live audible transmissions,
such as music performances, sports broadcasts, and news coverage, that reach the public in
unfixed form but can be simultaneously recorded.123 The relevant case law also supports a broad
interpretation of what may qualify as a “fixed” work: in Goldstein v. California, the Supreme
Court held that “writings ... may be interpreted to include any physical rendering of the fruits of
creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”124 Overall, both Congress and the courts highlight the
broad interpretation of fixation, allowing, for the most part, a “material object” enough of a
vehicle for the fixation requirement.125
What the fixation requirement does withhold from copyrightability, however, are those
works which are not “sufficiently permanent or stable to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”126 Examples of these include
“those [works] projected briefly on a screen, shown electronically on a television or other
cathode ray tube, or captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.”127
ii. Fixation of “Wildflower Works”
The Seventh Circuit held that Wildflower Works was not “fixed” for copyright purposes
because of the work’s “changeable” nature, that “its appearance is too inherently variable to
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supply a baseline for determining questions of copyright creation and infringement.”128 The
court’s assessment, however, does not follow the test for fixation presented in plain language in
§ 102(a).129 In fact, the court’s reasoning behind its decision is unmistakably at odds with both
Congress’s statutory interpretation in the accompanying House Report, and with the relevant
case law on this issue.
For Wildflower Works to be recognized as “fixed,” it must be (1) a tangible medium of
expression, and (2) must be permanent or stable enough to be perceived by an audience for
longer than a transitory duration.130 The Seventh Circuit conceded that Wildflower Works is both
tangible and can be perceived for more than a transitory duration, and so the question of whether
Wildflower Works meets the element of “fixation” should have ended there.131 Instead, the court
continued to reason that the work’s essence of dynamic and perpetual change dictates that it is
not stable or permanent enough to be called “fixed.”132 This last inquiry is neither required by
the Copyright Act, nor is it relevant to determine “fixation” for copyright purposes. The court’s
argument that the essence of change embodied in Wildflower Works as a garden precludes
copyrightability is on its face insignificant; establishing “fixation” is not a matter of a work’s
essence, but rather of its ability to express the author’s idea for more than a transitory duration.
In addition, the court’s argument is focused on the medium of the work rather than the overall
expression of the work.133 As it did with “authorship,” the court once again ignored the
analytical path mandated by the Copyright Act, and instead devised a new test for basic
copyrightability.134
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The majority opinion in Kelley is also internally inconsistent in its analysis of fixation.
While the court held firm to its impression that a medium subject to change within a work
defeats the work’s potential copyrightability, it later states that it is “not suggesting that
copyright attaches only to works that are static or fully permanent (no medium of expression
lasts forever), or that artists who incorporate natural or living elements in their work can never
claim copyright.”135 Despite its attempt to redeem itself from its disconcerting holding, the
Seventh Circuit’s failure to provide examples of what it was “suggesting” brings us one step
forward and two steps back.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding on “fixation” is especially counter-intuitive when we
consider the copyrightability of the examples discussed in the opinion in juxtaposition to the
court’s standard. One example discussed by the court is an artwork entitled Puppy by the
popular contemporary American artist Jeff Koons.136 This work, exhibited worldwide, is a
model of a puppy almost three stories high – and made using a metal frame, soil, geotextile
fabric, an internal irrigation system, and live flowering plants.137 In fact, at each exhibition the
blooms on Puppy are noticeably different in color, pattern, and growth.138 While this work
includes the same kinds of organic materials as Wildflower Works and the same changeable
nature, the Seventh Circuit posited—without any explanation—that Puppy is likely to be
considered “fixed” and thus copyrightable.139 This is a glaring contradiction, as in its opinion the
court had just previously declared that, because the “essence” of living flowers is to change,
works using them as a medium are ineligible for protection.140
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit’s standard for fixation cannot be reconciled with types
of works which are granted copyright protection directly by the language of the statue.
Choreography,141 though fixed only in the fleeting movements of a dancer, is copyrightable so
long as there is a written explanation of the steps, or a taped recording; it can be protected even
from infringers looking to copy the choreography from a live stage performance instead of from
the written description of the steps.142 Certainly this does not comply with the Seventh Circuit’s
denial of copyright protection for works with an “essence” of “vitality,” yet it is enough for the
guidelines set by the Copyright Act.143
C. Problematic Results
The Seventh Circuit’s dual holding on authorship and fixation is problematic for two
main reasons: first, the standard creates a bar against granting copyright protection to any work
made of a natural or living medium – a drastic blow to the art community. Such a disservice to
innovative contemporary artists will significantly hinder development in ground-breaking fields
such as bio-art and eco-art, as well as in more traditional art forms that use natural materials.144
Without the possibility of copyright protection, artists who work in these fields will be less likely
to take artistic risks, thus potentially stunting our society’s cultural growth.
Second, the resulting inconsistencies between this court’s holding and the statutory
language and case law threaten the uniform enforcement of copyright protection in the United
States. The court’s holding on “authorship” indicates that there are “right” and “wrong” kinds of
authorship for copyright purposes, and that the human creator of an original work might not
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always be an author after all. Additionally, the court’s problematic fixation standard and its
reluctance to exemplify the scope of this standard add nothing but unnecessary confusion to this
already inconsistent opinion. Not only do these new rules leave artists, specifically those
working with organic materials, in the dark as to the scope of potential copyright protection for
their works, but they also challenge and harm the ability of legal advocates to advise and educate
these artists in the area of copyright law.145
PART V: CONCLUSION
The relationship between law and culture is an interdependent one, characterized by
cycles of definition, slippage, and redefinition.146 Our legal regime, and the Constitution’s
Intellectual Property Clause specifically, is meant to promote progress, and the copyright system
is a key vehicle to both promoting and dictating this progress.147 As such, copyright is a
powerful engine for stimulating and facilitating creative and artistic outlets, and in organizing the
private cultural production and distribution of our artistic goods.148
In recognition of this power, and in deference to the progressive goals of the Constitution,
it is important for courts to refrain from using copyright to dictate or restrict our cultural progress
in the name of promoting it.149 While contemporary art may pose many questions—or even
perhaps concerns—about the artwork’s meaning or its level of artistic taste, the courts must not
twist the statutory standards for basic copyrightability in an effort to prove a cultural point; the
question “Is it art?” is not one to be determined in a court of law. Such “judicial activism” in the
art world is unwarranted and arguably harmful; it is only after the courts put aside notions of
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artistic taste and judgment that a proper copyright analysis can be applied to an artwork. The
courts must remain objective in their determination of copyrightability in order for cultural
progression in the arts to remain uninhibited and forward-thinking.
The present fate of Mr. Kelley and his Wildflower Works is an example of judicial
activism wielded through the powerful copyright system. The Seventh Circuit’s holding not only
opens up a Pandora’s Box of copyright issues for those artworks which incorporate natural
elements, but also greatly undermines the domains of such already nontraditional art.150 We are
fortunate to live in an era in which groundbreaking artistic developments happen daily.
However, it is precisely these innovative, and at times avant-garde, creations that are most in
need of supportive legal practices and policies if they are to survive and contribute in our
increasingly commercial and litigious society.151
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Images

Image 1: Chapman Kelley with his ellipses paintings.

Images 2 and 3: Kelley’s plan for Wildflower Works, and Wildflower Works from above.

Image 4: The park after the destruction of Wildflower Works.
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Images 5 and 6: Jeff Koons’ Puppy changing colors.
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